Continued Tensions between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan

Failure of talks; continued cross-border attacks; closure of border crossings and suspension of trade; regional dimensions; and reports of Pakistan's desire for regime change in Afghanistan

This piece takes a close look at the ongoing standoff between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan. It’s structured as follows:

• The failure of the third round of talks between the Pakistani and Taliban delegations in Istanbul

• Continued cross-border attacks since 9 October 2025.

• The closure of border crossings and suspension of trade

• Increased regional proxy engagement?

• Is Pakistan seeking regime change in Afghanistan?

• Regional efforts to revive talks

Failure of the third round of talks

The third round of talks between the Taliban and Pakistani delegations, which was held in Istanbul from 6 to 7 November 2025, ended in failure. This round was intended to build on agreements reached during the second round of talks in Istanbul from 25 to 30 October by establishing “a monitoring and verification mechanism that will ensure maintenance of peace” and imposing a “penalty on the violating party.” These two rounds followed the initial two-day talks in Doha from 18 to 19 October, which resulted in a ceasefire that was extended during the second round.¹

Each side blamed the other for the failure. In an 8 November statement, the Taliban’s chief spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, blamed it on the Pakistani delegation’s “irresponsible and non-cooperative attitudes” during the talks. He claimed that Pakistani representatives “attempted to refer all responsibilities regarding its security” to the Taliban government, without showing “any willingness to assume responsibility for either Afghanistan’s security or its own.”²

On the same day, Mujahed held a press conference to provide an update on recent developments and the activities of the Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). He asserted that the TTP emerged in 2002 in response to the Pakistani military’s cooperation with the United States in its global war on terror. Mujahed claimed that some groups in Pakistan are now giving the international community the “impression that the instability in Pakistan and the rise of the TTP began” with the Taliban’s capture of power in Afghanistan.³ He listed seven major operations that, according to him, the Pakistani military conducted against the TTP between 2002 and 2017 to argue that the Pakistani military had “engaged in fighting the Pashtun tribes and the TTP” long before the Taliban’s return to power.⁴

Mujahed also listed several actions that he claimed the Taliban had taken since seizing power in August 2021. These included:

• Relocating “tribal refugees living near the Durand Line —whose presence caused concerns in Pakistan—to central areas within Afghanistan.”

• Issuing fatwas “forbidding individuals from leaving Afghanistan to engage in jihad abroad without authorization from the Emir [the Taliban leader, currently Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada].”

• Supporting “conditions for direct negotiations between the Pakistani government and the TTP.”

Moreover, on 12 November, Rahmatullah Najib, the Taliban’s deputy minister of interior and a member of the negotiation team, claimed that the Pakistani delegation had demanded that the Taliban leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, issue a fatwa against the TTP and other insurgencies in Pakistan. The Taliban delegation rejected the demand, arguing that Akhundzada is the leader who issues decrees, not a fatwa. The Taliban delegation suggested that Pakistan could instead submit a written request to the Taliban’s Darul Ifta for consideration.⁵ The following quotes extracted from Najib’s remarks provide important insights:

We do not have the right to approve of the war there [in Pakistan], and at the same time, we do not have the right to issue a fatwa declaring it unlawful. It has nothing to do with us.

We told the Pakistani side that the fatwa is not issued by the leader, but by the Darul Ifta. The Pakistani government should [formally] request the Darul Ifta of the [Taliban government] to issue a fatwa (ask for a Sharia ruling). However, do not expect the fatwa to be according to your wishes, as it is issued in accordance with the requirements of Sharia. We cannot order the Darul Ifta what kind of fatwa to issue.⁶

On the other hand, the spokesperson for the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed in a statement issued on 9 November that, during the third round of talks, the Taliban engaged in “hypothetical allegations and unfounded claims” instead of focusing on the establishment of an effective monitoring mechanism. The statement also accused the Taliban of trying to prolong the temporary ceasefire without taking concrete and verifiable actions against the TTP and BLA “elements present on Afghan soil” and of misrepresenting “the issue of Pakistani terrorists hiding in Afghanistan as a humanitarian issue.”⁷

Continued cross-border clashes

While the Taliban and Pakistani delegations were meeting in Istanbul, reports emerged of a new round of cross-border attacks between the Taliban and Pakistani forces. Again, each side blamed the other for the clash. The Taliban’s spokesman, Mujahed, accused the Pakistani military of breaching the ceasefire agreed upon in the previous round of negotiations by opening fire on Spin Boldak. He also claimed that Taliban forces had not retaliated “out of respect for the negotiation team and to prevent civilian casualties.”⁸

The Pakistani Ministry of Information and Broadcasting rejected the claims by the Taliban, alleging that the Taliban had initiated the firing. The ministry said that the Pakistani forces “responded immediately in a measured and responsible manner” to the attack. It also claimed that, as a result of the Pakistani forces’ responsible action, the situation was brought under control and the ceasefire remained in place.⁹

On the night of 24/25 November, the Pakistani military reportedly carried out another round of airstrikes in Paktika, Khost, and Kunar provinces. The Taliban’s chief spokesman, Mujahed, confirmed the airstrikes, condemning them as “a direct assault on Afghanistan’s sovereignty and a clear breach of internationally recognized norms and principles by the Pakistani authorities.” He also described them as “operations driven by flawed intelligence [that] inflame tensions and expose the ongoing failures of Pakistan’s military regime.” Mujahed said that a “necessary response will be taken at the proper time.”¹⁰ Mujahed claimed that the Pakistani forces had specifically bombed the house of a civilian, Waliat Khan, son of Qazi Mir, in the Mughalgai area of the Gorbuz district, killing nine children (five boys and four girls) and one woman. According to him, four civilians were wounded in the air strikes in Paktika and Kunar.¹¹ His claims of casualties align with a report from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which confirmed that at least ten civilians were killed and six others injured in airstrikes in Khost and Kunar provinces the night before. UNAMA noted that most of the victims were children.¹²

However, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, the spokesman for the Pakistani military, denied to the reporters in Rawalpindi that the Pakistani forces had conducted overnight strikes in Afghanistan, saying that they would declare any attack they carried out.¹³ The airstrikes came hours after two suicide bombers attacked the headquarters of a paramilitary force in Peshawar, killing three security officials and wounding at least 12 people.¹⁴

Pakistan seems to have adopted a denial strategy for airstrikes inside Afghanistan, likely mirroring the Taliban’s denial of the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan and their assertion that the group is Pakistan’s internal problem.

Closure of border crossings and suspension of trade

Following the fighting between the Taliban and Pakistani forces on 11 October, border crossings between the two countries were closed and all trade and transit were suspended.¹⁵ On 21 November, the spokesman for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said during his weekly media briefing that Pakistan had “closed the border crossings and suspended all trade with Afghanistan” because of the support of the “Afghan Taliban Regime” for TTP and Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) “terrorist elements.” He said that the reopening of the border crossings hinged on the Taliban’s decision “to halt its support and abetment to terrorist outfits operating from the Afghan soil” and “stop Afghan nationals from carrying out terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.”¹⁶

In response, the Taliban have tried to shift the trade to routes passing through Iran and Central Asia and have also banned medicines from Pakistan, which will take effect after three months. On 12 November, Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, directed Afghan traders to seek alternative trade routes other than Pakistan. He also ordered them to stop importing Pakistani medicines, giving them a three-month deadline to settle any existing contracts with Pakistani companies. Baradar also instructed the Taliban’s Ministry of Finance not to clear customs or allow anyone to import medicines from Pakistan after this deadline.¹⁷

On 14 November, Abdul Salam Jawad Akhundzada, a Taliban spokesman for Afghanistan’s Ministry of Commerce, provided comparative figures illustrating a shift in trade volume from Pakistan to Iran. He told Reuters:

In the past six months, our trade with Iran has reached $1.6 billion, higher than the $1.1 billion exchanged with Pakistan. The facilities at Chabahar have reduced delays and given traders confidence that shipments will not stop when borders close.¹⁸

This means trade volume with Iran was $0.5 billion higher than with Pakistan.

Moreover, Nooruddin Azizi, the Taliban’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited India from 19 to 25 November. He met Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar and Commerce and Industry Minister Shri Piyush Goyal.¹⁹ During his visit, Azizi said that the Taliban would soon send a commercial attaché and that India would resume issuing trade and medical visas to Afghans. earlier, on 16 November, Ariana Afghan Airlines announced it would reduce cargo rates for imports and exports between Kabul and New Delhi, based on directives from Mullah Baradar.

Despite all these measures, it remains difficult for the Taliban easily to find an alternative to Pakistan. For example, Fazlullah Niazi, the head of Afghanistan’s Pharmaceutical Importing Companies Union, alluded to this challenge when he told BBC Farsi that Afghanistan currently imports 60 to 70 percent of its medicines from Pakistan (with the remaining 30 percent imported from countries such as India, Türkiye, Iran, and Bangladesh). This means it would be difficult for traders to meet the three-month deadline, as they usually place orders with Pakistani pharmaceutical companies three months in advance. He also mentioned other procedures in place.²⁰

Explosions in Delhi and Islamabad: increased proxy engagement?

On 10 November, a car bomb targeted the Red Fort area in New Delhi, killing 15 people.²¹ The following day, a suicide bomber blew himself up outside a busy court in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, killing at least 12 people.²²

On the same day, 11 November, the spokesman for the Taliban’s foreign ministry, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, issued separate statements condemning the attacks in India and Pakistan. There was a marked contrast in the language and tone of the statements regarding the attacks in the two countries. The ministry only expressed “deep sorrow and condemnation” regarding the attacks in Islamabad and Wanna (without mentioning the Pakistani government or people). However, its statement about the explosion in New Delhi also extended its deep sorrow to the victims’ families, the Indian government and people.²³

The Pakistani Minister of Defense, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, was quick to point the finger of blame at the Taliban in Afghanistan. He said in a post in Urdu on X, “We are in a state of war…. The rulers of Kabul can stop terrorism in Pakistan, but bringing this war up to Islamabad is a message from Kabul, to which Pakistan… has the full power to respond.” He said that expecting successful negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan would be “futile” in this environment.²⁴ He also did not rule out a military response inside Afghanistan.²⁵

On 25 November, Pakistan’s Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Attaullah Tarar, claimed that they had “very clear-cut evidence” that the TTA (the Afghan Taliban) and the TTP were jointly behind the bombing in Islamabad. He told a press conference that the country’s Intelligence Bureau and Counter Terrorism Department had arrested four suspects, including the handler Sajidullah, known as Sheena, within 48 hours of the attack. He claimed that the attack had been orchestrated by TTP commander Nur Wali Mehsud through his commander Dadullah, who is based in Afghanistan. According to Tarar, Sajidullah, who first joined the TTP in 2015 and received training from the TTP across Afghanistan, met Dadullah in Afghanistan in 2023, 2024, and in August 2025.²⁶

Is Pakistan seeking regime change in Afghanistan?

There seems to be an increasing debate about Pakistan’s desire for regime change in Afghanistan. On 20 November, the New Lines magazine reported that “Islamabad is already planning regime change” partly because of the Taliban cultivating closer ties with India. According to the magazine, “Islamabad has opened channels of dialogue” with representatives of anti-Taliban armed groups.²⁷

Similarly, on 22 November, the Ambassadors’ Lounge, “a non-partisan initiative by some of the most experienced diplomats of the Foreign Service of Pakistan,” held a talk on “Should Pakistan go for regime change in Afghanistan” with Asif Durani, Pakistan’s former special envoy for Afghanistan, and Amjad Ali Sher, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Cambodia. Asif Durani said that “this Taliban regime is heading toward a regime change by themselves because they have proved that they are unable to govern and control the country.”²⁸ The moderator, Ambassador Imran Yawer, concluded that the future of Afghanistan and the region should not remain in the hands of a regime, which is “repressive,” “unpopular,” and “isolated” at home, while “systematically encourag[ing] terrorism” abroad. He said, therefore, a regime change is “desirable for a more meaningful stability in the region.”

Regional efforts to revive talks?

A high-level Turkish delegation led by the Turkish intelligence chief and including ministers such as the energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, is visiting Pakistan this week to discuss the growing tension between Pakistan and the Taliban. İrfan Neziroğlu, Türkiye’s ambassador to Pakistan, confirmed the planned visit on 21 November.²⁹ It seems that the visit was first decided by Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif during their meeting in Baku early this month.³⁰

Meanwhile, the media reported on 23 November that Saudi Arabia has also offered to mediate between the Taliban and Pakistan. Similarly, earlier, on 17 November, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told a conference in Tehran that they were working to convene a regional conference on stability and peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The spokesman for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tahir Hussain Andrabi, told Dawn that Pakistan welcomed Iran’s offer of mediation.³¹

However, it remains to be seen if Pakistan’s latest overnight airstrikes inside Afghanistan will impact the Turkish delegation’s visit or its efforts to revive talks between the Taliban and Pakistan.

1. See Ali Yawar Adili, “A Breakthrough After A Breakdown: An update on the Taliban-Pakistan talks,” Substack, 30 October 2025; and Ali Yawar Adili, “Update on the Ceasefire Agreement between the Taliban and Pakistan in Doha,” Substack, 20 October 2025.

2. Mujahed’s full statement, which he posted on X:

Clarification on the outcomes of the Istanbul meeting
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan once again thanks the Republic of Turkey and the State of Qatar — the two brotherly countries — for hosting and mediating the talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Istanbul.

Representatives of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, by special direction of the leadership, participated in Istanbul in good faith and with appropriate authority on two consecutive days (November 6 and 7), hoping that this time the Pakistani side, after consultation with its leaders, would approach the issue seriously and constructively, with a responsible attitude, and present realistic and implementable demands to reach a fundamental solution.

During the talks, the Pakistani side attempted to refer all responsibilities regarding its security to the Afghan government, while at the same time it did not demonstrate any willingness to assume responsibility for either Afghanistan’s security or its own.

The irresponsible and non-cooperative attitude of the Pakistani delegation resulted in no outcome, despite the Islamic Emirate’s good intentions and the efforts of the mediators.
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan reiterates its principled position: it will not allow anyone to use Afghan territory against another country, nor will it permit any country to use its territory to take actions against or support actions that undermine Afghanistan’s national sovereignty, independence, or security.

The Muslim people of Pakistan are brothers of Afghans; the Islamic Emirate wishes them well and hopes for peace, and will cooperate with them within the limits of its responsibilities and capabilities.

The defense of the people and land of Afghanistan is the Islamic and national duty of the Islamic Emirate, and it will firmly defend against any aggression with the help of Allah and the support of its people, Insha’Allah.

Zabihullah Mujahid
Spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate
1447/5/17 AH 1404/8/17 HS — 2025/11/8 AD

3. Remarks by Mujahed:
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All praise is due to Allah, Who is sufficient for us, and may peace and blessings be upon His chosen servants.

To proceed:

Today, we wish to brief you on the latest developments in the negotiations held in Turkey, as well as the emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and several related matters. Unfortunately, certain military elements in Pakistan appear to perceive a strong central government in Afghanistan, along with stability, security, and development, as contrary to their interests. For years, they have taken advantage of Afghanistan’s instability, conflicts, and displacement. Once again, they appear intent on creating tensions through manufactured pretexts. We are well aware that these anti-Afghanistan policies are not supported by the devout population of Pakistan, its political parties, or its respected religious scholars.

Some groups have falsely accused the Islamic Emirate, presenting to the international community the impression that the instability in Pakistan and the rise of the TTP began with the arrival of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. In reality, both the insecurity and the emergence of the TTP date back to 2002, primarily as a result of misguided policies by certain elements within the Pakistani military, which at the time aligned with the United States and allowed drone strikes in Waziristan while simultaneously turning against the local population. They repeatedly conducted large and small-scale operations, causing civilian casualties, destroying homes, and imprisoning many innocent tribal residents.

We wish to recall several instances of past confrontations between the Pakistani military and the disadvantaged Pashtun tribes to demonstrate that the TTP issue predates the Islamic Emirate and has no connection whatsoever with it.

Overview of Military Actions and Clashes in the Tribal Areas Involving the TTP: The TTP emerged in 2002 in response to the Pakistani military’s cooperation with the United States, which included drone strikes and aerial bombardments in Waziristan. Since then, Pakistani forces have carried out a series of operations against the TTP, while the group has continued to launch both major and minor attacks across Pakistan up to the present.

1. In March 2002, the Pakistani military launched its first operation against the TTP, named Operation Al-Mizan, in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, and Orakzai Agency. Over 80,000 local residents were displaced.

2. In 2007, the Pakistani military conducted Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat and Malakand, displacing approximately 400,000 people, some of whom were relocated near the Afghan border.

3. In 2008, Operation Sher Dil (Lion’s Heart) in Bajaur Agency displaced around 600,000 people.

4. In October 2009, Operation Nijat in South Waziristan displaced approximately 300,000–400,000 local residents.

5. In July 2011, Operation Koh-e-Safid (White Mountain) in Kurram Agency displaced about 100,000 people.

6. On June 15, 2014, Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of Anger) in North Waziristan forced nearly one million people to leave their homes, with over half crossing into Afghanistan. Camps were set up in Khost and Paktika for the displaced.

7. From 2014–2017, Operations Khyber I–IV in Tirah and Bara regions displaced 300,000–500,000 people, most of whom relocated to Nangarhar province in Afghanistan.
   Report on Operation Al-Mizan
   Report on the operations and displacement in Swat.
   Report on the refugees residing in Afghanistan prior to the Emirate’s governance:

These documented facts show that the Pakistani military was engaged in fighting the Pashtun tribes and the TTP even before the arrival of the Islamic Emirate. They themselves admitted that, in the so-called fight against terrorism, 80,000–90,000 military personnel and civilians were killed. Their admission regarding Pakistani military and civilian casualties before the Islamic Emirate’s governance:

Major incidents in Pakistan prior to the Islamic Emirate’s governance:
The issue of attacks and related damages in Pakistan is not a new phenomenon linked to the arrival of the Islamic Emirate. Large-scale attacks and heavy casualties had already occurred on Pakistani soil long before, which clearly shows that this issue is primarily Pakistan’s own internal problem, not one caused by the Islamic Emirate.

• In August 2007, the TTP captured 300 Pakistani soldiers alive during operations in South Waziristan, who were later exchanged along with forty members of Baitullah Mehsud’s group.

• On August 21, 2008, an attack was carried out on a weapons manufacturing facility in Punjab, Pakistan, resulting in the deaths of numerous people.

• On June 2, 2008, a car bomb targeted the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, resulting in the deaths of several people.

• On October 28, 2009, a car bomb exploded in the Mena Bazaar area of Peshawar, killing numerous people.

• In October 2009, a car bomb attack occurred in the Shangla area market of Swat, killing up to 47 people.

• On May 22–23, 2011, the Karachi Naval Air Station (PNS Mehran) was attacked, reportedly killing 18 naval officers and injuring 16 others.

• On December 16, 2014, the Army Public School (APS) incident occurred in Peshawar, resulting in the deaths of approximately 150 people and injuring 134 others.
  Numerous other attacks and incidents have taken place in Pakistan; we have mentioned only a few representative cases here.

Steps Taken by the Islamic Emirate Regarding Previously Displaced Tribal Populations After Taking Power:

• Facilitated meetings and dialogue among political leaders, religious scholars, and refugees who had arrived in Afghanistan.

• Relocated tribal refugees living near the Durand Line—whose presence caused concerns in Pakistan—to central areas within Afghanistan, providing organized camps for proper management and oversight.

• Prohibited the carrying and possession of weapons among the tribal refugee population.

• Established a reform commission to address community issues and ensure continuous monitoring.

• Issued religious rulings (fatwas) forbidding individuals from leaving Afghanistan to engage in jihad abroad without authorization from the Emir.

• Supported conditions for direct negotiations between the Pakistani government and the TTP, resulting in a long-term ceasefire and substantial progress in talks, which were subsequently undermined by certain factions within the Pakistani military.

Currently, the tribal refugees residing in Afghanistan had settled here prior to the arrival of the Islamic Emirate. As previously noted, their migration was caused by the misguided policies of certain factions of the Pakistani military and the violence and military operations in the tribal regions. The Islamic Emirate warmly welcomes any efforts and measures that enable these refugees to safely return to their homes.
At the same time, despite all these measures, the Islamic Emirate continues to consider itself responsible for ensuring that no one uses its territory to interfere in the affairs of another country, and it will take necessary steps to prevent such actions, God willing.
Zabihullah Mujahid
Spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate
17/5/1447 AH
17/8/1404 HS – 8/11/2025 CE

4. Mujahed provided a list of the following operations that, according to him, the Pakistani government carried out against the TTP between 2002 and 2017:

• Operation Al-Mizan in March 2002

• Operation Rah-e-Rast in 2007

• Operation Sher Dil (Lion’s Heart) in 2008

• Operation Nijat in October 2009

• Operation Koh-e-Safid (White Mountain) in July 2011

• Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of Anger) in June 2014

• Operations Khyber I–IV from 2014-2017.

5. “Taliban Amir isn’t a mufti: Afghanistan snubbed Pak’s demand for fatwa,” India Today, 12 November 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-afghanistan-talks-taliban-snub-islamabad-amir-akhundzada-isnt-mullah-after-pak-ttp-fatwa-2818303-2025-11-12

6. “Taliban Negotiation Member: Pakistan Asked Us to Issue Fatwa against War in That Country,” BBC Farsi, 12 November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/dari/articles/cg43dyrle20o

7. The statement said:

In the aftermath of Pakistan’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2015, terrorists belonging to the so-called TTP/FaK [fitn al-khawarij, a term the Pakistani government uses to refer to the TTP] fled to Afghanistan. They abetted [the] Afghan Taliban in their fight against the ISAF and [the] Afghan Government of the time. These terrorists and their families are now being harboured by [the] Taliban regime as a payback for their allegiance to [the] Afghan Taliban. The same terrorists have established training camps in Afghanistan to launch terrorist activities in Pakistan.

See “Statement by the Spokesperson,” Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 November 2025, https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/statement-by-the-spokesperson-8?mission=statements

8. See the statement issued by Zabihullah Mujahed on 6 November below:

While the third round of negotiations with the Pakistani side has begun in Istanbul, unfortunately, this afternoon Pakistani forces once again opened fire on Spin Boldak, causing concern among the local population.

The Islamic Emirate’s forces, out of respect for the negotiation team and to prevent civilian casualties, have so far shown no reaction.

It is worth noting that in the previous round of negotiations, both sides had agreed to extend the ceasefire and prevent any acts of aggression.

9. See the statement issued by the Pakistani Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on 6 November below:

We strongly reject claims circulated by the Afghan side regarding today’s incident at the Pak-Afghan border at Chaman. Firing was initiated from the Afghan side, to which our security forces responded immediately in a measured and responsible manner.

The situation was brought under control due to responsible action by Pakistani forces and the ceasefire remains intact. Pakistan remains committed to ongoing dialogue and expects reciprocity from Afghan authorities.

10. Zabihullah Mujahed, “Response to yet another violation of Afghanistan’s territory by Pakistani forces,” X, 25 November 2025, https://x.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1993228477596942635?s=20

11. Zabihullah Mujahed’s post in English on X here: https://x.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1993142109805986176?s=20

12. UNAMA’s post on X here: https://x.com/UNAMAnews/status/1993347897765802258?s=20

13. “DG ISPR refutes allegations by Afghan Taliban of Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan: state media,” Dawn, 25 November 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1957285/dg-ispr-refutes-allegations-by-afghan-taliban-of-pakistani-airstrikes-in-afghanistan-state-media

14. “Five dead in suicide bombing in Pakistan,” BBC, 24 November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgkv47xqn5o

15. “Afghan transit trade to remain suspended until evaluation of security situation: FO,” Dawn, 24 October 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1950983

16. “Transcript of the Weekly Media Briefing by the Spokesperson on Friday, 21 November 2025,” Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 November 2025, https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/transcript-of-the-press-briefing-by-the-spokesperson-on-friday-21st-november-2025

17. “Abdul Ghani Baradar: Afghans should stop trade and transit with Pakistan,” BBC Farsi, 12 November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/dari/articles/cwy5k4lpyj4o

18. “Afghanistan shifts trade to Iran route to avoid Pakistan closures,” Reuters, 14 November 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghanistan-shifts-trade-iran-route-avoid-pakistan-closures-2025-11-14/

19. “Visit of Minister of Industry and Commerce of Afghanistan to India,” Minister of External Affairs, 25 November 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40335/Visit_of_Minister_of_Industry_and_Commerce_of_Afghanistan_to_India

20. “Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad; Taliban government shifts trade route to Iran,” BBC Farsi, 15 November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cy0kzqjd7zno

21. Pranshu Verma and Supriya Kumar, “Delhi car blast reveals limits of Modi’s new war doctrine, analysts say,” The Washington Post, 22 November 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/11/21/india-red-fort-attack-terrorism/

22. Saeed Shah and Asif Shahzad, “Suicide bombing in Pakistan capital kills 12, raises regional tension,” Reuters, 11 November 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/explosion-injures-eight-outside-court-pakistans-capital-police-say-2025-11-11/

23. Abdul Qahar Balkhi, “Remarks reading attacks in Islamabad and Wana,” X, 11 November 2025, https://x.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1988215352107618488?s=20

24. Asif’s post in Urdu here: https://x.com/KhawajaMAsif/status/1988174246284324989?s=20

25. “Pakistani Defense Minister: We do not rule out the possibility of military action in Afghanistan,” BBC Farsi, 12 November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c5y9z18n2n2o

26. Tarar’s post and video on X: https://x.com/TararAttaullah/status/1993361817184485563?s=20

27. Tam Hussein, “Pakistan Is Quietly Shopping for New Proxies in Afghanistan,” New Lines Magazine, 20 November 2025, https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/pakistan-is-quietly-shopping-for-new-proxies-in-afghanistan/

28. “Should Pakistan go for regime change in Afghanistan?” Ambassadors’ Lounge, 22 November 2025,

29. “Three Rounds of Talks Fail; Türkiye Moves To Reengage Pakistan & Taliban,” Afghanistan International, 22 November 2025, https://www.afintl.com/en/202511222313; and “Turkiye spymaster in delegation visiting Islamabad amid Pak-Afghan tensions,” Geo TV, 22 November 2025, https://www.geo.tv/latest/634841-turkiye-spymaster-in-delegation-visiting-islamabad-amid-pak-afghan-tensions

30. “Turkish delegation to meet in Pakistan aiming to seal peace deal with Afghanistan,” Reuters, 9 November 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/turkish-delegation-meet-pakistan-aiming-seal-peace-deal-with-afghanistan-2025-11-09/

31. “Pakistan ‘welcomes’ Tehran’s offer to mediate with Afghanistan,” Dawn, 17 November 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1955558